Governing organic food exporting: possibilities for democratic engagement and impacts for smallholder farmers by Lyons, Kristen
Governing Global South–North Organic Food Exporting: 
Possibilities for Democratic Engagement and Impacts for 
Smallholder Farmers
KRISTEN LYONS
[Paper first received, 15 May 2013; in final form, 10 October 2013]
Abstract. Export of certified organic agricultural products is one of a number of 
market-based development strategies for improving the socio-economic and eco-
logical realities of smallholders in the Global South. Yet the outcomes of partici-
pation in these export-led initiatives have been mixed. The extent to which or-
ganic export agriculture might deliver benefits to smallholders is, at least in part, 
related to the deliberative capacity of organic governance processes – on which 
participation in organic exporting relies. Deliberative capacity is taken to include 
broadly inclusive and authentic inclusion of smallholders, and other local actors, 
in organic governance processes. This article contributes to understandings of 
participation in organic governance and its outcomes by evaluating smallhold-
er and other Southern actor engagement in three aspects of organic governance 
arrangements: organic standards, compliance and inspection requirements. The 
results presented here – drawing from fieldwork in Uganda and Ghana – dem-
onstrate that, on the one hand, organic governance arrangements are character-
ized by limited democratic engagement and decision-making; standard-setting 
processes largely exclude smallholder and other Southern actor interests, as well 
as creating new forms of dependency between smallholders and export compa-
nies. However, and in other circumstances, the introduction of group certification 
and local inspection services has provided smallholders with bargaining power 
with export companies and northern buyers. These spaces point to possibilities 
for organic governance to improve the socio-economic and ecological realities of 
smallholders in the Global South.
Introduction
Pathways for ‘development’ in the Global South frequently situate the globalization 
of rural land and labour as central to economic growth. This ‘global development’ 
agenda has delivered socio-economic and ecological problems for Southern small-
holder farmers, and exacerbated domestic food insecurity and food import depend-
ence1 in many countries and regions (Bello, 2009; FAO, 2010; McMichael, 2010). Yet 
despite its limits, especially in terms of its capacity to deliver national and local-level 
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food security, global development is normalized and institutionalized via a range of 
regulatory and policy frameworks, and demonstrated in a range of contemporary 
processes, including international trade, foreign direct investment and the so-called 
global land grabs (McMichael, 2010, 2013; Cotula, 2012). Responses – and resistance 
– to this development model are varied. On the one hand, civil society, smallholder 
farmers, consumers/citizens and researchers have coalesced in a diversity of alter-
native food networks and food sovereignty movements,2 including those that aim to 
localize markets, shorten agri-food supply chains, and support peasant and subsist-
ence agriculture (Whatmore et al., 2003; Whittman et al., 2010; Holt Giménez and 
Shattuck, 2011). A number of Southern and Northern actors have also sought to im-
prove export markets by embedding socially and environmentally sustainable prac-
tices, including via the formation of alternative agri-food standards. Organic food 
and farming standards are amongst these. In recent years the certified organic sector 
has experienced significant growth in the Global South. While there remain gaps in 
the data related to organic production, the FAO (1999) predicted an expansion in 
South–North organic trade of 20% each year and as an outcome of this expansion, 
an estimated 10% of the world’s organic farmers are now located on the African con-
tinent, with most of these smallholders (Parrott and Marsden, 2002; Bouagnimbeck, 
2008; Willer and Kilcher, 2011). The majority of Africa’s certified organic produce is 
sold on export markets, demonstrating the emphasis on certified organic agriculture 
as a ‘trade not aid’ approach to development, as well as the limited presence of do-
mestic organic markets and local alternative food-trading networks (for example, 
see Freidberg and Goldstein, 2010).
The expansion of African organic exporting raises a number of obvious tensions. 
For example, some food justice activists have argued export-led agriculture reduces 
the land and labour available to ensure local and/or national food security, as well 
as tying smallholder livelihoods to the whims of Northern consumer preferences, 
corporate actors, and organic certification requirements (for example, see Freidberg, 
2004; Parrott et al., 2006; Lyons et al., 2012). Some within the organic movement have 
also opposed African organic exporting on the basis of concerns that airfreight of 
organic food (and the associated carbon emissions) is antithetical to the core envi-
ronmental principles of the organic movement. This ‘food miles’ debate3 coalesced 
in 2007 when the UK Soil Association proposed organic standards would prohibit 
the use of airfreight for transport of organic produce. While the UK Soil Association 
subsequently dropped this proposal, thereby appearing to respond to broad calls 
for social and economic justice for African smallholder farmers via participation in 
international organic markets, many unresolved questions and tensions remain.
It is in this contested terrain around South–North organic exporting this research 
is located. In this article, I examine the extent to which the expansion of export-
led certified organic agriculture opens space for authentic and inclusive forms of 
deliberative democracy (see Dryzek, 2009), and with outcomes that might enable 
smallholder farmers and other Southern actors to shape their socio-economic and 
ecological realities, including the outcomes of their participation in export markets. 
To assess this, empirical data are drawn from research in Uganda and Ghana, coun-
tries that have undergone varying degrees of expansion in organic exporting across 
commodities and sectors.
The results presented suggest mixed outcomes in terms of smallholders’ and 
other Southern actors’ deliberative capacity. On the one hand, the analysis demon-
strates the certified organic sectors in Uganda and Ghana are sustained, to a great 
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extent, via the exclusion of Southern actors (including national organic peak bodies, 
civil society and farm groups) in general from the governance of organic agriculture, 
and smallholders in particular. This is demonstrated in the dominance of Northern 
actors in defining both organic governance arrangements and the content of organic 
standards; and the limited extent to which Ugandan and Ghanaian organic farm and 
civil society organizations and smallholders have succeeded in shaping organic ag-
ri-food export networks in ways that represent their socio-economic and ecological 
interests. As such, the claims of development agencies and corporate actors related 
to the impacts for smallholders associated with participation in organic exporting 
are often disconnected from the lived realities of smallholders themselves.
However, and at the same time, some organic farm and civil society organizations 
and smallholder farmers have negotiated aspects of the terms of their participation 
in export markets, including their relationships with export buyers. The formation 
of a smallholder group certification scheme and local inspection arrangements has 
been central in establishing the conditions for this deliberative capacity. In these 
contexts, actors have been able to shape aspects of both the processes, and outcomes, 
of alternative organic agri-food initiatives. This bargaining power of organic small-
holders and other Southern actors represents what Friedmann and McNair (2008) re-
fer to as ‘cracks’ in international trade deliberations, providing potential new path-
ways to ensure trade relationships are equitable and socially just.
Global Agri-food Development and Democratic Engagement
Agri-food systems are characterized by ongoing technological, economic and so-
ciocultural transformation. In recent decades, this transformation and restructuring 
has been shaped significantly by structural adjustment, modernization and indus-
trialization (see McMichael, 2010, 2013). The production and consumption relations 
that underpin the corporate food regime that has emerged from this transformation 
are shaped by corporate markets and global value chains, and mediated via global 
private standards and regulations (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; McMichael, 2010; 
Oya, 2012). This regime is also underpinned by mantras of growth and productiv-
ity, which in turn drives further technological innovation across the agriculture and 
food sectors.
The policies and practices underpinning the corporate food regime shape the 
global development project, and further integrate smallholder and peasant farmers 
into cash cropping and export markets; including as suppliers of ‘dessert’ commodi-
ties such as bananas, sugar, cacao and coffee, as well as non-traditional and out-
of-season crops, including cut flowers and winter vegetables to Northern markets 
(Freidberg, 2004; Dolan, 2008; Holt Giménez et al., 2009). This transformation from 
traditional and/or domestic production, to production for export markets, has oc-
curred unevenly across temporal, geographic and social locations (Borras et al., 2008, 
p. 170). Despite this variation, general trends emerging from these restructuring pro-
cesses demonstrate growing import dependence and food deficits for countries in 
the South, the results of which have greatly reduced Southern farmers’ capacity to 
control their food systems (Holt Giménez et al., 2009).4 The expansion of the corpo-
rate food regime has also reduced the viability of agroecological and low-carbon 
farming systems (Patel and McMichael, 2009).
Opposition to the social and ecological ruptures associated with export-led ag-
ricultural development is articulated in a diversity of alternative food networks 
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and food sovereignty movements (Schanbacher ,2010; Holt Giménez and Shattuck, 
2011). While some of these movements are not antithetical to export agriculture, they 
frequently place at their core support for trade policies and practices that, first and 
foremost, serve the rights of people, and only after that consider food as a tradeable 
good.
But what form and content might trade policies and practices take so as to serve 
the rights of people, especially smallholder and peasant farmers in the Global South? 
For international peasant movement La Via Campesina this includes trade relations 
that are ‘appropriate to democratic conditions of food production and distribution’ 
(McMichael, 2005, p. 287). It is the extent to which organic export agriculture might 
convergence with democratic conditions, and their effectiveness in delivering social 
and ecological benefits to smallholders, that is the focus of this article.
While there is a range of approaches for evaluating the democratization of organic 
governance arrangements, and its outcomes, this article focuses on aspects related 
to decision-making processes. Drawing from deliberative democratic political the-
ory, deliberation and participation are now widely recognized to be part and parcel 
with democratic decision-making (Dryzek, 2009; Sarkissian et al., 2009; Pretty, 2012). 
Proponents of deliberative democracy assert that those affected by decision-making 
should be engaged in dialogic processes related to such decisions, and in ways that 
enable them to shape the outcomes so as to reflect their social, economic, ecological 
and other aspirations and needs (for example, see Dryzek, 2009). While this par-
ticipatory turn is widely recognized as being one of a number of mechanisms for 
democratizing decision-making processes, and their outcomes, it is also critiqued 
for failing to deliver on such promises. The ‘inclusive’ and ‘empowering’ discourses 
frequently associated with deliberative engagement, for example, are also criticized 
for masking the exclusion of certain groups – including minority groups – thereby 
reinforcing the interests of the most powerful (for example, see Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). And after civil society and social movement (often) hard-fought victories for 
recognition as legitimate actors in deliberative dialogues, their inclusion in ‘insider’ 
deliberations may be ineffective in influencing decision-making in ways that deliver 
positive social and environmental changes. Participation in deliberative processes 
may also redirect scarce organizational resources away from other, arguably more 
strategic, activities (Schlosberg and Dryzek, 2002; Whelan and Lyons, 2005).
In the context of such limits, Dryzek (2009, p. 1382) has articulated some of the 
terms and conditions that might be required for effective and democratic dialogue 
and decision-making – or more broadly, what he refers to as ‘deliberative capacity’. 
First, he argues deliberation must be authentic, enabling participants to freely reflect 
on their values and beliefs, including the freedom to change one’s mind, as well as 
to reciprocate with others engaged in deliberative processes. Second, deliberative 
processes should be broadly inclusive of a diverse range of actors, representing a 
broad range of interests and discourses. Third, deliberative processes should result 
in outcomes that have consequences for decision-making.
To critically evaluate the extent to which organic exporting might engender dem-
ocratic dialogue and decision-making – or more specifically, deliberative capacity – 
this article examines decision-making processes related to the governance of organic 
food and agriculture. A number of participatory and inclusive models of organic 
certification have emerged in recent years, including related to organic certification 
in the Global South, that form the basis of this analysis (see Hatanaka, 2010; Nelson 
et al., 2010; Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011; Lyons et al., 2012). This participatory turn 
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is particularly evident in the African context, and is connected with growing calls 
for greater inclusion of African actors in organic governance arrangements. The Lu-
saka Declaration on Mainstreaming Organic Agriculture into the African Develop-
ment Agenda, for example – an outcome of the Second African Organic Conference, 
Lusaka, Zambia, 2–4 May 2012 – articulated the importance of both participatory 
research and collaboration with African stakeholders to ensure equivalence between 
African and export organic standards, including international recognition of the 
East African Organic Products Standard.
To date, there has been relatively little research that evaluates the various forms 
of deliberative decision-making processes in export organic agri-food networks, and 
the effectiveness and implications of these deliberative models for democratic gov-
ernance (for research in related fields, see Raynolds, 2004; Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2008; 
Dolan, 2010; Hatanaka, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010). This article contributes towards 
filling this gap, by analysing the social relations that shape South–North exporting 
of organic agriculture produce.
More specifically, in this article I will evaluate critically the extent to which the so-
cio-economic and ecological realities and priorities of smallholders and other South-
ern actors are brought to bare as part of decision-making processes, and in turn are 
reflected in organic standards and compliance requirements and processes. On the 
basis of these findings, I will assess the authenticity of claims related to democratic 
and participatory organic governance with the lived realities of those engaged in 
certified organic agriculture exporting and organic governance arrangements in the 
Global South.
On the one hand, South–North export relations have been repeatedly defined by 
their inequitable power relations, injustice and food insecurity (Holt Giménez et al., 
2009; Oya, 2012). However, and at the same time, organic governance arrangements 
(including standard-setting, auditing, etc.) represent sites of negotiation and strug-
gle between stakeholders from the South and North – particularly as international 
organic certification bodies seek to ensure organic standards are locally appropriate, 
meaningful and acceptable, and as international traders seek to engage local com-
munities as part of a broader commitment to corporate social responsibility. As such, 
organic agri-food governance provides spaces for civic and democratic engagement, 
and where smallholders are – to some extent – able to occupy multiple, fluid and 
contested roles in shaping both the agricultural development agenda and its socio-
economic and ecological outcomes (Larner and Le Heron, 2002; Gibson-Graham, 
2006; DuPuis and Gillon, 2009; Raynolds, 2012). Friedmann and McNair (2008) de-
scribe these spaces of civic engagement (and contestation) as ‘cracks in the asphalt’, 
or openings for smallholders, farming organizations and others to assert bargaining 
power, thereby reshaping agriculture and food systems. Adding to this understand-
ing, Raynolds (2012) describes such civic engagement as providing space for social 
regulation, where the values of diverse actors, including social movements, are able 
to inform organic standards. Examining these spaces of civic engagement – the focus 
of this article – opens up the possibilities for identifying and analysing the contin-
gent, partial and fluid bargaining power of smallholders, and in so doing, avoids 
polarizing the experiences and socio-economic and ecological outcomes associated 
with engaging in export-led agriculture (see Oya, 2012).
This article now turns to an overview of organic agriculture governance globally. 
This provides the context to examine the extent to which smallholders and other 
Southern actors have been engaged in deliberative processes, and with outcomes 
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that have shaped decision-making related to organic exporting in two selected coun-
tries, Uganda and Ghana.
The Governance of Organic Agriculture
The corporate food regime has enabled the production of high-volume and, until 
recently, low-cost food. Yet the recent spikes in food prices (in 2007–2008, and again 
in 2011) – an outcome of a combination of factors, including speculative investment 
by finance capital, the burgeoning agrofuel industry and climate change, amongst 
other factors, may signify the end of cheap food (for example, see Moore, 2012). This 
increasingly costly (in economic, social and ecological terms) bulk and largely undif-
ferentiated food is incompatible with the values of a growing number of producers, 
consumers, retailers, civil society organizations and others, who value ‘quality’, in-
cluding foods differentiated on the basis of their social, environmental and animal 
welfare attributes. Reflecting this, in recent years there has been a significant expan-
sion of market and non-market arrangements for the provision of quality produce, 
including farmers’ markets, community supported agriculture (CSA) and Slow Food 
movements (Donati et al., 2010), as well as the proliferation of quality governance 
mechanisms, including production standards, monitoring, certification and label-
ling (including fair trade, GLOBALG.A.P, Rainforest Alliance and organic agricul-
ture) (Raynolds, 2004, 2012; Bacon, 2008; Jaffee and Howard, 2010; Oya, 2012). These 
governance mechanisms provide traceability for quality attributes across increasing-
ly complex and distanced agri-food chains, including South–North organic export 
trade relationships. The emergence of organic (and other) governance arrangements 
is demonstrative of the so-called ‘audit culture’ that characterizes the neo-liberal 
governance of food and agriculture, and agriculture in the Global South is now com-
monly mediated by one, or a number, of these quality standards (Campbell and Le 
Heron, 2007; Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2008; Campbell, 2009; Lawrence et al., 2013).
This article is focused on governance arrangements for the expanding organic 
agriculture sector. Since the introduction of the first organic standard in 1973 by the 
UK Soil Association, Willer et al. (2008) estimate there are at least 468 governmental 
and non-governmental agencies that offer organic certification services. Organic cer-
tification is obtained (usually after a period of conversion) via proof of compliance 
with a set of standards, and generally with verification via third party-certification. 
Organic standards stipulate allowable inputs (e.g. animal manures and some natural 
herbicides), allowable practices (e.g. crop rotations, companion planting and ani-
mal husbandry practices), as well as prohibited substances (including synthetically 
derived agricultural chemicals, genetically modified organisms, and antibiotics). In 
addition, organic standards stipulate a range of social criteria (including reference to 
labour relations, gender equity and child labour) in an attempt to ensure equitable 
conduct as part of organic production and trade relations, as well as a range of envi-
ronmental management criteria (biodiversity, soil fertility and water conservation), 
and detailed record keeping requirements.
Growth of Organics in the Global South
The production of organic food and agricultural commodities has grown rapidly in 
the Global South in recent years, with at least 90 Global South countries producing 
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organic products in commercial quantities, and worth an estimated USD 500 mil-
lion (Barrett et al., 2002; Raynolds, 2004; Willer and Kilcher, 2011). Demonstrative 
of certified organic sector expansion in the Global South, in 2010 an estimated 40% 
of the world’s organic producers were in Asia, followed by Africa (28%) and Latin 
America (16%) (Willer and Kilcher, 2011). The majority of African organic produce 
– and the majority of organic produce from the Global South – is sold to export mar-
kets, including the European Union, the United States and Japan. Only two African 
nations (Egypt and South Africa) have reported sizeable domestic markets (Willer 
et al., 2008). The organic crops grown in Africa include fresh vegetables from Egypt, 
Kenya, South Africa and Zambia, dried fruit from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, 
Madagascar and Morocco, coffee from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, 
tea from Tanzania and Uganda, palm oil and cocoa from Ghana and olive oil from 
Tunisia (for a detailed list, see Bouagnimbeck, 2008).
While traditional and/or subsistence farming methods – including crop rotations, 
intercropping, mulching and organic pest control – are frequently described as ‘pas-
sive’ or ‘de facto’ organic (for example, see Jaffee, 2007 and Parrott and Marsden, 
2002, respectively), recent growth has been recorded in the certified commercial or-
ganic sector.5 While de facto and certified organic farms may not demonstrate sig-
nificant differences in terms of actual farming practices, certified organic farmers 
are required to provide proof of compliance with a set of internationally recognized 
agronomic, ecological and social criteria; aspects that are verified via detailed record 
keeping and regular farm inspections.
The expansion of certified organic agriculture and the integration of Southern 
farmers and smallholders into organic export markets is the focus of a growing body 
of agri-food and development scholarship. Prior research has examined the extent 
to which organic governance (alongside other factors, including the entry of corpo-
rate firms) signifies the ‘conventionalization’ of organic agriculture (for example, 
see Guthman, 2004; Campbell et al., 2010). Research in this area has identified the 
co-option of organic movement interests by powerful Northern actors and capitalist 
interests, and the subsequent weakening of organic standards, as well as adversely 
impacting farmers by introducing additional bureaucratic requirements and costs 
related to compliance (for example, see Buck et al., 1997; Guthman, 2004; Gómez 
Tovar et al., 2005; Jaffee and Howard, 2010). Bacon (2008), Gómez Tovar et al. (2005), 
Arora et al. (2013) and others have also examined the livelihood impacts associ-
ated with entry into certified organic agriculture, including standards compliance 
requirements, as well as the privileging of larger farms, while Raynolds (2004, 2012) 
and others have identified the dominance of Northern actors in defining the con-
tent of organic standards. There is also a growing body of work that examines the 
gendered dimensions of participation in certified organic markets, including related 
to the labour process, resource access and ownership (for example, see Lyon et al., 
2010).
To date, however, there has been limited research that examines the politics of 
Southern actor engagement in organic governance processes (including standard-
setting, auditing processes, etc.), and the extent to which such engagement might 
deliver democratic decision-making – or what Dryzek (2009) refers to as ‘delibera-
tive capacity’ – thereby democratizing export trade.6 Through an analysis of aspects 
of the social relations of production related to organic governance, this research 
makes a contribution towards filling this gap.
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Research Methods
The results presented in this article draw from an initial four months fieldwork in 
Uganda in 2005, one month fieldwork in Ghana in 2006, and follow-up fieldwork in 
Uganda for a period of between two and four weeks in 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 
2013. These countries were selected to examine Southern actors’ participation in, 
and experiences of, organic governance for a number of reasons. In 2005, when this 
research began, Uganda had the largest area under certified organic production in 
Africa. Uganda remains in the lead in terms of certified organic land in Africa; with 
226 954 hectares of certified organic, or around 1.74% of Uganda’s total agricultural 
land (Willer and Kilcher, 2011). There has been significant investment in Uganda’s 
organic sector from development agencies, including the Swedish International 
Development Corporation Agency’s (SIDA) support for the Export Promotion of 
Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) to facilitate organic exports (Gibbon et al., 
2007). The EPOPA programme ran between 1995 and 2008 (operating in three East-
African countries: Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia), and providing financial support 
to 30 organic export companies (Parrott et al., 2006). According to Agro Eco and 
Grolink (Agro Eco Louis Bolk Institute, 2009), EPOPA has supported the conversion 
of an estimated 30 000 smallholder farmers to organic farming practices in Uganda 
alone. In 2005, when fieldwork in Uganda began, EPOPA was providing financial 
support to at least 11 companies engaged in the export of tropical fruits, cotton, 
vanilla, coffee, Nile perch, tilapia, sesame and spices, with a number of additional 
companies in the process of obtaining organic certification (including for shea but-
ter, essential oils and honey). Interviews were undertaken with smallholders under 
contract with two of these export companies – Amfri Farms (tropical fruits) and 
Kawacom International (coffee).
In contrast, organic agriculture in Ghana represents just 22 276 hectares, or 0.15%, 
of total agricultural land (Willer and Kilcher, 2011). The Ghanaian organic agricul-
ture sector has received only a few international financial supports, including fund-
ing from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to establish a 
national peak body, the Ghana Organic Agriculture Network (GOAN). A number of 
large commodity traders – including the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company 
and the Ghana Cocoa Board – are also engaged in the production of small quantities 
of organic produce, alongside their much larger conventional production. An esti-
mated 3,000 farmers were certified organic in 2006, a figure that is estimated to have 
grown since then, and by 2009 covered around 29 140 hectares, producing essential 
oils, herbs, horticultural crops, palm oil and cocoa. Interviews were undertaken with 
smallholder vegetable producers, cocoa and oil palm producers.
Fieldwork included in-depth interviews with over 60 women and men organic 
smallholders, including 40 pineapple and coffee growers in Uganda, and 20 cocoa, 
oil palm and mixed vegetable growers (including cabbage and tomatoes) in Ghana. 
In Uganda, initial fieldwork was followed up with focus group discussions with 
a group of 15–20 growers, who were members of an organic cooperative up until 
2013. Interviews were also undertaken with a number of representatives from ex-
port companies: Amfri Farms, a domestically owned tropical fruit export company; 
and the international coffee trading company, Kawacom International in Uganda; 
and the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company, owned mostly by a single Belgian 
shareholder, as well as minority Ghana shareholders. In addition, interviews were 
conducted with representatives from the national peak organic organizations (Na-
tional Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda – NOGAMU, and Ghana Organic 
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Agriculture Network – GOAN), as well as from national and international organic 
certification organizations and development agencies. It also included participant 
observation at a number of events, including meetings, training days and work-
shops, as well as textual analysis of a range of government and industry documents, 
including research papers, advertising and promotional print and web-based mate-
rial.
The data collected as part of this research have been analysed with a focus on 
smallholders’ and other Southern actors’ lived experiences in the context of South–
North organic governance arrangements, with a specific focus on deliberative capac-
ity in terms of processes related to organic standard-setting, group certification and 
local inspection. The following discussion presents the analysis of this data.
Democratizing Organic Governance Processes? Organic Standard-setting
As explained earlier in this article, entry into organic export markets relies on or-
ganic certification, which is granted upon compliance with a set of organic stand-
ards. The codification of organic principles, beliefs and practices into systematic 
production, auditing and certification standards and requirements is not straight-
forward. Rather, standards are negotiated (and renegotiated) by movement and 
market actors, including farmers, farmers’ organizations, development agencies, 
processors, retailers, traders, consumer groups and others (Lockie et al., 2006; Du-
Puis and Gillon, 2009; Raynolds, 2012). Friedmann and McNair (2008, p. 409) have 
described these messy negotiations related to organic standard-setting as represent-
ing ‘arena(s) for contestation, multiplication (and) confusion’. At the same time, for 
DuPuis and Gillon (2009) this dialogue and/or negotiations related to the content 
of standards, compliance procedures and others aspects provides opportunities for 
actors to (re)shape the technologies of organic governance. Yet the extent to which 
Southern actors have been effective in shaping organic governance processes and, 
more broadly, the deliberative capacity of these processes appears mixed. To assess 
the deliberative capacity of South–North organic governance arrangements, and the 
impacts of this for the democratization of organic exporting, this article starts by 
examining the place of African smallholders, farm organizations and civil society in 
shaping processes related to the content of organic standards.
There is little doubt that some local actors have succeeded in ensuring their in-
clusion in dialogic processes alongside other international actors regarding setting 
organic standards. Since at least the early 2000s, for example, a number of represent-
atives from Uganda have attended events organized by the international organic ag-
riculture peak body, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM), including conferences and trade fairs (e.g. BioFach).7 Yet these forms of in-
clusion appear to be at the lower end of the participatory spectrum (see Sarkissian et 
al., 2009), with Ugandan actors occupying ‘observer’ roles, and African organic pro-
duce part of an exotic ‘display’. While Ugandan actors (both people and products) 
are present, this passive status renders them as recipients of information, including 
standards, rather than engaged in active roles – including in forums where aspects 
of governance, including organic standard-setting, are negotiated and settled.
Yet in what appears to signify a shift from this passive recipient status, one Ugan-
dan representative from NOGAMU – the national organic certification body – was 
elected to the IFOAM World Board in 2008 for a three-year term. This was alongside 
the appointment of four other Global South representatives, out of a total of 10 mem-
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bers. In this role, the Ugandan representative of the World Board has participated in 
the Steering Committee of Organic Standards East Africa, as well as being a member 
of the regional standards working group responsible for drafting the East African 
Organic Standards. The engagement of this actor at the global level, including inclu-
sion in standard-setting processes, may signify the growing capacity of Southern 
actors to participate in international dialogue over time.
While the inclusion of a Ugandan representative indicates an attempt to widen 
the scope in terms of both the actors and interests engaged in dialogic processes – 
aspects commensurate with that of deliberative capacity – there are significant limits 
in the extent to which this has translated into outcomes that are broadly representa-
tive of local interests and concerns. Despite the inclusion of a Ugandan in dialogue 
related to international standard-setting, for example, representatives from national 
organic organizations in both Uganda and Ghana, and a representative from the 
national organic certification organization UgoCert, lamented this appointment had 
delivered few impacts in terms of shaping the content of organic standards. As a 
result, they described organic standards falling short in terms of reflecting the inter-
ests and realities of African smallholders, and other Southern actors. The failure to 
recognize equivalence between Ugandan and IFOAM standards related to livestock 
handling demonstrates this.
Organic standards for livestock handling require animals to be reared on land that 
is certified organic. In Northeast Uganda, the Karamojong – an ethnic group of pas-
toral herders that have resided in this region since the 1600s – frequently move cattle 
across large areas of land, not all of which is certified organic. Representatives from 
UgoCert and NOGAMU agree it is highly unlikely activities that could exclude land 
from compliance with organic standards are happening in this region where the 
Karamojong range their cattle. The region has been – up until very recently – char-
acterized by political and social instability, including regular cattle raids, and is iso-
lated from incompatible land uses such as chemical-intensive agriculture and min-
ing. As such, UgoCert requested principles of equivalence (see Barrett et al., 2002) 
to enable Karamojong to obtain organic certification. A representative from UgoCert 
explained land that cattle were grazed on in Northeast Uganda, while not certified 
organic, was equivalent to certified organic land. Despite years of negotiation on this 
issue, IFOAM eventually rejected this proposal, a decision that has excluded some 
herders from obtaining organic certification. A representative from UgoCert reflect-
ed on this outcome: ‘We have no bargaining power, we have absolutely no say.’
As this case demonstrates, while representatives from Uganda’s organic sector 
have been included in negotiation processes related to standard-setting, including 
via the election of a Ugandan representative on the IFOAM World Board, they ex-
press frustrations related to their constrained positionality in terms of shaping the 
actual outcomes of these processes. While a Ugandan representative was present in 
standards negotiations, they described being constrained in their capacity to shape 
the content of standards. Other examples of struggles related to organic standards 
equivalence continue, demonstrated, for example, in the yet to be resolved negotia-
tion process related to international equivalence for the East African Organic Prod-
ucts Standard (see the 2012 Lusaka Declaration on Mainstreaming Organic Agricul-
ture into the African Development Agenda).
The challenges related to the equivalence of organic standards are demonstrative 
of a broader concern raised by many Ugandan and Ghanaian organic advocates: 
that inequitable power relations enable Northern interests to ‘speak for’ Southern 
 Governing Global South–North Organic Food Exporting 345
stakeholders. While the participatory turn in international organic governance has 
encouraged Northern organic inspectors and certifiers to ‘speak with’ Southern 
farmers, farmers’ organizations and organic organizations – including as part of 
their management of internal control and participatory guarantee audit systems, 
detailed further below – there was little evidence that such dialogue translated into 
significant shifts in terms of the actual content of organic standards. As an outcome, 
smallholder farmers and representatives from organic organizations frequently de-
scribed organic standards as inconsistent with their lived realities.
This schism was particularly evident in discussions related to the content of so-
cial standards. A representative from UgoCert, for example, lamented that social 
criteria (including standards related to labour conditions, gender equity, etc.) were 
often irrelevant and/or culturally insensitive to local circumstances. For example, he 
described the emphasis of organic standards on the rights and working conditions 
of plantation workers. He explained, however: ‘We don’t have plantation workers 
in Uganda; we have thousands of smallholder farmers, who mostly don’t employ 
farm labour. Organic standards are yet to adequately deal with the concerns and 
interests of smallholders.’ This example highlights the mismatch between labour-
related issues on organic farms – including the specific issues for smallholders, such 
as the burden of costs and time related to ensuring organic compliance for farm 
families with small land size and minimal income – and the content of organic stand-
ards. This disconnect is revealing, given there are such social (and economic) justice 
claims associated with organics that are frequently relied upon as the basis for ex-
port companies’ corporate social responsibility agenda.
This disconnect between the content of standards and smallholders’ lived reali-
ties was not only raised in relation to organic standards, but also regarding other 
quality standards smallholders were compliant, or undergoing compliance with. For 
example, a number of smallholder producers required certification with Fairtrade 
and Utz Kapeh to comply with export buyer requirements (see Bacon, 2008). Like 
organic standards, these quality standards imposed requirements some smallhold-
ers described as inappropriate. For example, at a Fairtrade standards training day 
for organic smallholder pineapple producers in Southwest Uganda, extension offic-
ers explained that smallholders would be required to buy gumboots as protective 
footwear while they worked their plots. This engendered strong opposition from 
smallholders – including vocal group discussion and some heckling – who were oth-
erwise supportive of Fairtrade principles, and enthusiastic at the prospects of a price 
premium associated with Fairtrade certification. Yet one smallholder exclaimed: 
‘Why would we buy gumboots when we can’t always afford food.’ It was not sim-
ply the cost of purchasing gumboots that elicited a strong response from smallhold-
ers, but also the widely shared view that protective footwear was neither urgent, 
or an important, health and safety issue. Rather, smallholders identified malaria, 
complications during childbirth as well as AIDS and syphilis as significant health-
related issues in their community. Protective footwear was low on their list of pri-
orities compared to making available malaria testing and anti-malarial treatments, 
as well as local midwifes and doctors to assist women during childbirth. Even in 
cases where deliberative processes might enable diverse perspectives and issues to 
come to light – a first step towards deliberative capacity – the results presented here 
demonstrate these issues and concerns were constrained in terms of translation into 
locally relevant standards.
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Similarly, organic cocoa producers in Ghana discussed inconsistencies between 
Fairtrade claims related to social and economic justice, and their lived realities. One 
older cocoa producer, for example, exclaimed: ‘How can this be fair trade? I am an 
old woman and I still need to work each day in the hot sun to earn money, I have 
no savings.’ Despite improvements in market access, Fairtrade had failed to enable 
this smallholder to earn sufficient income so as to instigate a savings plan that could 
enable her to retire from farming at an age she believed was appropriate. Rather, 
this farmer – and like many others – was dependent on the buyer, the Ghana Cocoa 
Board, for her income and livelihood, and with little space to negotiate her interests. 
Even with Fairtrade’s involvement, the working conditions and relationship with 
the buyer failed to meet this farmer’s expectations regarding a reasonable quality 
of life.
Overall, the evidence presented here reveals moments of Southern actor inclu-
sion in standard-setting processes. It is evident in representation on international 
standard-setting committees, such as IFOAM, enabling Southern actors to engage in 
negotiations related to the content of organic standards. However, this appears yet 
to be matched by substantial changes in terms of the content of organic standards. 
Indeed, the results presented here demonstrate that while some Southern actors are 
included in standard-setting negotiations, their interests appear to be excluded from 
the outcomes of such dialogue (see Raynolds et al., 2007; Dolan, 2008; Lyons et al., 
2012; Smith and Lyons, 2012; Raynolds, 2012). In this light, participation of Southern 
actors may be read as a strategy to legitimize standard-setting processes, by being 
seen to broaden the scope for inclusive engagement and dialogue. Yet organic (and 
other quality) standard-setting processes appear to fall short in terms of their delib-
erative capacity, leaving little room for Southern actors to play a substantial role in 
informing the content of organic standards in ways that better represent their lived 
realities, including issues and concerns.
Shifting South–North Power Relations? Group Certification and Local 
Inspection
While the experiences of smallholders and farm organizations in Uganda and Ghana 
related to standard-setting processes and the content of organic standards points 
to limited deliberative capacity, there were other activities that demonstrated the 
democratization of export trade relationships. Foremost among these activities in-
cluded the formation of smallholder group organic certification schemes.
To obtain organic certification, smallholders, and other farmers, are required to 
verify compliance with organic standards through detailed record keeping of farm 
activities. The imposition of an individualized audit model in the south has been 
widely critiqued (for example, see Mutersbaugh, 2002; Raynolds, 2004, 2012; Dolan, 
2010). One agricultural consultant expressed his frustrations at what he (and others) 
understood to be the inappropriate ‘European model’ of organic certification. He 
was one of a number of people advocating for significant changes to pathways for 
organic compliance:
‘Early on, they were trying to use audit systems developed for EU large 
farmers rather than smallholders, so we ended up trying to develop some-
thing that was a bit more appropriate’ (Agricultural Consultant, Kampala, 
Uganda).
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In East Africa (and elsewhere), there have been strong calls to restructure organic 
audit arrangements in ways that will enable them to more appropriately reflect the 
diverse and locally specific circumstances of smallholders. It is in this context that 
the impetus to develop a smallholder group certification scheme arose. Group cer-
tification is based on the organization of smallholders into groups, and with an or-
ganic certificate awarded to the group – and generally held by the export company 
– rather than individual smallholders. Management of the group occurs via an inter-
nal control system (ICS). The ICS employs an internal quality control document that 
stipulates requirements related to growing methods, post-harvest handling, record 
keeping and other activities.
This audit model has reduced the cost associated with organic certification, condi-
tions that assist in explaining the recent increase in the numbers of certified organic 
smallholders in countries in the Global South (for example, see Lyons et al., 2012). 
Yet while this new smallholder-specific audit model has opened the way for the 
inclusion of smallholders in certified organic export trade, many farmers practising 
organic methods remain unable to join organic groups. Organic pineapple and cof-
fee smallholders in Uganda, and cocoa producers in Ghana, for example, recounted 
stories of neighbours they knew who were unable to join their organic smallholder 
group, due to the limited quantity of certified organic produce their export buyer 
was able to take. The export buyer is responsible for deciding which smallholders 
are to be included as group members, circumstances that privilege exporters as de-
terminants of the distribution of benefits associated with participation in organic ex-
porting, as well as, at times, creating conditions for animosity and jealousy between 
smallholders.
Some smallholders who were members of organic groups also spoke of familial 
ties influencing purchasing arrangements within their group. Some pineapple pro-
ducers in Uganda, for example, expressed frustration that certain group members 
were able to sell greater quantities of pineapples to the export buyer, than they were 
able themselves. They explained this as an outcome of local buyers showing prefer-
ence for their family members. While a representative from Amfri Farms, an export 
buyer, explained that decision-making related to the distribution and quantity of 
purchases across group members was determined by smallholders’ capacity to com-
ply with ‘quality’ indicators, including size and colour – not personal favours – some 
smallholders were not convinced by this explanation. Organic coffee producers who 
sold to Kawacom International raised similar concerns, citing favouritism amongst 
family members as a frequent factor in shaping organic coffee buying arrangements 
amongst their group members.
These concerns related to buying arrangements suggest that, while group cer-
tification has enabled the entry of large numbers of smallholders into organic ex-
port markets, at the same time smallholder groups demonstrate inequities that are 
manifest in a disproportionate distribution of benefits amongst smallholders. Export 
companies demonstrate significant power in determining the distribution of these 
benefits, given their opportunity to grant preference to some growers above others. 
Despite some attempts by export companies to make decisions related to their buy-
ing arrangements transparent, some growers describe these processes as shrouded 
in subterfuge; circumstances that are antithetical with the democratization of mar-
kets. In recent years, the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative also lamented the 
extent to which their buyer, Amfri Farms, has reduced the quantity of pineapples 
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they purchase from the cooperative. This has created new pressures, and moments 
of conflict, between cooperative members.
There are other aspects of group certification that, while opening spaces for small-
holder entry into organic export trading, have also constrained smallholders’ and 
other Southern actors’ capacity to negotiate the terms of their involvement, render-
ing them dependent upon their export buyer. For example, the export company 
holds the organic certificate, circumstances that result in recognition of smallholders’ 
organic status reliant upon the company they supply. On the one hand, smallholders 
identified a number of benefits associated with this arrangement, including a reli-
able market for the sale of their organic crops, the provision of extension services, 
training, equipment, and other materials for use on the farm (for example, see Lyons 
and Burch, 2007). Some organic coffee smallholders also spoke of the difficulties in 
finding a market for their coffee beans prior to the arrival of Kawacom. Without a 
local buyer for their coffee, some growers had resorted to crossing the border into 
Kenya – which they described as both dangerous and illegal – in the hopes of find-
ing a market for their coffee beans. The arrival of Kawacom had, for many growers, 
simplified the pathway to market.
On the other hand, smallholders also argued that tying recognition of their or-
ganic status to an export company created unequal power relationships, including 
enabling export companies to ‘call all the shots’; including defining the terms of the 
relationship between themselves and their suppliers. Such findings are not unique 
to organic trade, and are commensurate more generally with other studies related 
to the impacts of contract farming in Africa (for example, see Barrientos and Dolan, 
2006; Oya, 2012). Demonstrative of this inequitable relationship, Ugandan and Gha-
naian smallholders described having little bargaining or negotiating power with 
their buyer. For example, some organic coffee and cocoa smallholders reported that 
their buyers did not always make payment for their organic crops within mutually 
agreed time frames. This was something to which smallholders had little recourse. A 
number of Ghanaian organic cocoa producers also spoke of frequent delays for pay-
ment for their crops. Such circumstances left smallholders economically vulnerable, 
and had adverse impacts for household food security, as well as the ability to pay 
for health and education related expenses. And yet, again, these were circumstances 
they described as having had few options to resist or respond to.
Similarly, coffee smallholders at Sipi Falls in Uganda expressed frustrations with 
what they described as ‘empty promises’ – or unfulfilled commitments – they had 
heard over the years from their buyer, Kawacom International. For example, many 
coffee smallholders spoke of Kawacom’s commitment to supply tarpaulins for uti-
lization during coffee drying, and lamented that only a few households in the com-
munity had ever received these, and those that had been provided were now worn 
and required replacement. Yet despite this frustration, they described feeling pow-
erless to respond, given their dependence on Kawacom for the sale of their coffee.
Smallholders in Uganda also described situations where buyers rejected their or-
ganic produce on the basis of their failure to comply with market requirements. On 
a visit to the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative in Uganda, for example, one 
smallholder presented a number of tattered black-and-white photocopies of photos 
that showed produce (pineapples and bananas) that were described by their export 
buyer as non-compliant with export standards. The bananas had some marks on the 
skin, and the pineapples were reported to be a larger size than market requirements. 
The export buyer, Amfri Farms, provided these photos as indicators of poor quality. 
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Yet these photos had engendered both confusion and anger amongst smallholders, 
with one farmer despairing: ‘What do you Europeans want? We don’t know what 
you want? Only when our produce is not good enough do we find out what you 
don’t want.’ This smallholder’s concern was supported by others, who expressed 
frustration at the limited information made available related to organic production 
standards.
The arrangement on which group certification is based – with certification held 
with the export buyer rather than individual growers – clearly creates both oppor-
tunities and constraints for smallholders, and with mixed impacts in terms of de-
mocratizing market relations. On the one hand, smallholders appear relegated to 
the margins, occupying the role of price-takers and recipients of export company 
scattered and inconsistent offerings – often under the banner of corporate social re-
sponsibility – and with little deliberative capacity to negotiate the terms of their 
relationship with their buyer.
Yet this is not the only story. In one instance, for example, the Katuulo organic 
smallholder group was able to countervail inequitable producer–exporter South–
North power relationships. The bargaining power of this smallholder group was 
evident in the range of beneficial socio-economic outcomes members of the Katuulo 
Organic Pineapple Cooperative were able to negotiate with their export buyer, Am-
fri Farms. Members of the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative had, in recent 
years, negotiated an arrangement with Amfri Farms to assist in transport of produce 
to local markets. Prior to negotiating this arrangement, smallholders travelled via 
foot, or in a few cases, via bicycle, to deliver produce to local markets. According to 
some smallholders from the Cooperative, the provision of transport arrangements 
by Amfri Farms had eliminated – or at least reduced – a time-consuming and physi-
cally demanding task from their workload. In addition, Amfri Farms have also pro-
vided various supports related to the construction of a community health clinic; 
including transport of building materials. In explaining their decision to support 
the health clinic, a representative from Amfri Farms stated it was in the interest of 
their company to support ongoing social and community development at Katuulo, 
as well as at their other organic farming community sites. While Amfri Farms’ sup-
port for the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative demonstrates an extension of 
their corporate social responsibility mandate, there was also evidence to suggest the 
bargaining power of the cooperative was instrumental in shaping the form of these 
supports.
For example, the Katuulo organic smallholder group’s capacity to negotiate with 
Amfri Farms was described by both smallholders and Amfri Farms’ representatives 
as being assisted by their long-standing existence, as well as their formalized struc-
ture of governance with elected representatives, regular meetings, and a coopera-
tive bank account and communal savings plan.8 A representative from Amfri Farms 
stated the cooperative structure, as well as other attributes of the group, readied 
them for compliance with group certification processes required for both organic 
and Fairtrade certifications. He also emphasized the benefits and simplicity of work-
ing with an already formed cooperative, especially in terms of ensuring compliance 
with the internal control system. He described the Katuulo Cooperative as ‘effective 
and coordinated’, and one of their ‘best groups’ of organic smallholders. He also 
stated the company ‘relied’ – indeed ‘depended’ – upon ‘good farmers’, including 
members of the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative, to ensure the regular sup-
ply of quality fresh fruit to their international buyers. While Katuulo was one of their 
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most remote suppliers (over 200 kilometres from Kampala, where Amfri Farms dries 
and packages fruit prior to export from Entebbe International Airport), representa-
tives from Amfri Farms explained that the cost associated with extra travel was more 
than compensated by the benefits of working with this cooperative.
In other words, on the basis of their cooperative structure and associated organi-
zational capacity, the Katuulo smallholder group demonstrated some bargaining 
power in deliberations with their buyer. Such deliberative capacities indicate the 
‘opening up’ of negotiations in ways that may assist, more broadly, to democratize 
organic markets. Yet the decline in sales from Katuulo by Amfri Farms in recent 
years raises questions about the long-term bargaining power of this group of small-
holder farmers.
In addition to the introduction of smallholder group certification providing new 
opportunities for deliberative capacity, the introduction of domestic organic inspec-
tion arrangements also provides a site to examine the extent to which organic gov-
ernance might align with democratic governing principles. To date, most organic 
inspection for compliance with organic standards in the global south is undertaken 
by international inspectors (including IMO, EcoCert and SKAL) (Barrett et al., 2002; 
Arora et al., 2013). This arrangement is costly, as well as raising a number of cross-
cultural challenges related to the interpretation of standards. In 2004 in Uganda, 
UgoCert – and along with support from a number of other national and interna-
tional organizations – was successful in obtaining international recognition to con-
duct local inspection.9 The development of a joint inspection protocol in Uganda 
– whereby local inspectors undertake inspection on behalf of international certifiers 
– has provided a precedent for the establishment of domestic inspection protocols 
for the recently drafted Regional Organic Agriculture Standard in East Africa, as 
well as inspection processes in other African nations. While the discussion above 
indicates (at least to date, but this something that may be expected to shift over time) 
the Ugandan organic sector has achieved little in terms of shaping the content of 
organic standards, the introduction of domestic inspection opens spaces for local ac-
tors to engage as moral arbiters in the interpretation and implementation of organic 
standards.
There is strong support among some Southern actors for the use of local inspec-
tors, with growing pressures exerted on export companies to utilize local inspectors, 
including funding from EPOPA contingent upon the use of local inspectors:
‘Many operators here in Uganda are actually putting pressure on their cer-
tifiers to use the local inspectors, so that the costs can be reduced. So, many 
of the operators are refusing to meet the costs of flying in an inspector from 
the UK, or Germany’ (EPOPA Representative, Kampala, Uganda).
Both smallholder group certification and the introduction of local inspection ser-
vices have created spaces for smallholders and other Southern actors to negotiate the 
inclusion of local priorities. These spaces for civic engagement signify opportunities 
for the participation of Southern actors in deliberations and other decision-making 
processes related to global organic agriculture governance and trade.
The results presented here suggest smallholders who are members of a farm co-
operative prior to their entry into certified organic export trade can be expected to 
have significant capacities that equip them to bargain with their export buyer. Coop-
erative, and other forms of collective organizing, signifies strategies to maintain and 
extend the ‘cracks’ in organic governance arrangements in which Southern actors 
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are able to negotiate their interests. Yet there is much work to be done in this regard, 
given many cooperatives were disbanded in Uganda, and elsewhere, alongside neo-
liberal agriculture reform (Wiegratz, 2010).
This research also demonstrates smallholder groups with fewer members have 
been able to ensure greater transparency and accountability (including relating to 
purchasing arrangements), in comparison to larger groups. Members of the Katu-
ulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative, for example, could at least identify who the 
favoured suppliers in their group were, and had initiated a process to ensure that, 
throughout the course of the growing season, each cooperative member was pro-
vided with an opportunity to sell additional pineapples. In contrast, coffee growers 
at Sipi Falls – with group membership of over 3,000 smallholder farmers – did not 
know all the members in their cooperative, and had little access to knowledge re-
lated to the purchasing arrangements across this large membership base.
Smallholders’ bargaining power also appeared to be related to their proximity to 
markets. Organic growers with limited market opportunities – including organic 
coffee growers at Sipi Falls in Uganda, for example – were tied to Kawacom Interna-
tional, both geographically and contractually, given the organic certificate was held 
with the company. This dependence closed down smallholders’ opportunities to ne-
gotiate, for fear of losing their market altogether. Circumstances were similar for 
organic oil palm producers under contract with the Ghana Oil Palm Development 
Corporation (GOPDC). Out-growers under contract with the GOPDC described 
themselves as having little room to manoeuvre in terms of their buying arrange-
ments. These growers were tied to the GOPDC via a 20-year contractual arrange-
ment. If oil palm growers broke their contract, they not only lost access to a market 
for their oil palm, they also lost the land on which their oil palm was farmed. Under 
such circumstances, smallholders had few options, and little deliberative capacity, 
to negotiate with their buyer.
Conclusions: Organic Governance and Opportunities for Democratic 
Engagement?
Global rural development and the corporate food regime have driven an export ag-
riculture agenda that has delivered food insecurity and social and ecological prob-
lems for the Global South. This food crisis also intersects with the contemporary 
fuel and climate crises. The expansion of export-led organic markets in the Global 
South raises tensions amongst supporters of alternative agri-food initiatives related 
to the extent to which this pathway for rural development – driven by develop-
ment agencies, corporate actors, parts of the organic movement, Northern consum-
ers and others – might perpetuate the same inequities and injustices. Amongst these 
includes concerns organic exporting will simply replicate unfair and ecologically 
fragile South–North relations that have come to underpin conventional trade, as 
well as rendering organic smallholders dependent upon the whims of both the glob-
al machinations of organic governance regimes, as well as a broad range of Northern 
stakeholder interests (including retailers, consumers, etc). In a context of rising food 
prices, such circumstances may be expected to worsen food insecurity and food cri-
ses for exporting Southern nations.
This article contributes to this debate by problematizing South–North relations 
through an examination of the nuanced relationships that emerge within, and across, 
diverse technologies of organic governance. In particular, the artcile has sought to 
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contribute to debates related to the extent to which the technologies of organic gov-
ernance – on which export trade relies – might provide new opportunities for de-
liberative capacity, thereby democratizing South–North organic export market rela-
tionships? This article has focused on Uganda and Ghana due to the centrality of the 
African continent to broader debates about organics and the future of food – given 
the continents’ rapidly expanding certified organic agriculture sector.
This article has examined the extent to which organic governance arrangements 
demonstrate and/or facilitate deliberative capacity amongst Southern actors, par-
ticularly smallholder farmers. Here, deliberative capacity is taken as one measure 
for the democratization of deliberative processes that underpin market relations. 
This article has examined three aspects of organic governance, including organic 
standard setting, group certification and local inspection processes.
The results presented paint a mixed picture. On the one hand, Ugandan and Gha-
naian smallholders, and other local actors, have been limited in the extent to which 
they have been able to shape organic governance arrangements and their outcomes. 
While some Ugandan actors participate in standard-setting processes, they have 
gained little ground in terms of shaping the actual content of organic standards. 
Rather, the results presented here demonstrate that processes to define the socio-eco-
nomic and ecological conditions of certified organic agriculture have largely been 
captured by Northern stakeholder interests. Group certification has also, in some 
instances, created new forms of dependency between smallholders and export buy-
ers, circumstances that are maintained by the opacity of various aspects of organic 
governance arrangements. Ugandan and Ghanaian actors lament that new forms of 
participation and inclusion are constrained by inequitable power relations, includ-
ing between smallholders, certifiers, export buyers and retailers. As a result, South-
ern actors describe being at the whims of local and international export buyers. But 
this is not the only story.
At the same time, Ugandan and Ghanaian smallholders, farm and civil society 
organizations (and often in collaboration with other Southern and Northern actors) 
have succeeded in shaping some aspects of organic governance arrangements, in-
cluding the introduction of a smallholder group certification scheme, and via the 
introduction of local inspectors. There was also evidence of smallholder groups ne-
gotiating with their buyers in ways that were delivering outcomes that reflected 
smallholders’ needs and interests. Such activities – albeit small, compared to broad-
er trends in the organic and conventional agri-food sectors – represent moments of 
deliberative capacity, and may signify further ruptures in the corporate food regime.
These ‘cracks’ are opportunities for the democratization of organic governance 
processes. On the basis of research presented here, certified organic exporting from 
the Global South, and the technologies of organic governance on which it relies, 
demonstrate small, and precarious, moments of democratic engagement. Widening 
these ‘cracks’, thereby normalising inclusivity, transparency, as well as meaningful 
and deep engagement with Southern actors – in other words, facilitating delibera-
tive capacity – will be a necessary precursor to ensure certified organic exporting 
might play a part in building a democratic food future.
Notes
1. Alongside increasing dependence on food imports in the Global South, their cost is also estimated to 
have risen by 11% in 2010, and by up to 20% for low-income food-deficit countries (FAO, 2010).
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2. Amongst these food sovereignty movements includes seed saving, women’s cooperatives, the forma-
tion of local food and farming networks, as well as opposition to genetic engineering and inappropri-
ate forms of food aid (Holt Giménez et al., 2009).
3. The debate that followed this proposal by the UK Soil Association highlighted the potential discord in 
marrying organic farming and international rural development agendas, particularly in the context of 
concerns about climate change, peak oil and local food security. Yet at the same time, others responded 
with concerns that African smallholders were being asked to carry the burden of responses to climate 
change, a position that was frequently articulated in media headlines, including claims that ‘effort(s) 
to curb climate change may hurt African farms’ (Clayton, 2007).
4. While the African continent was self-sufficient in food through the 1960s, and between 1966 and 1970 
was a net exporter, by 2008 the continent was importing 25% of its food (Holt Giménez et al., 2009).
5. It is likely the non-certified organic sector in Africa is much larger than the certified organic sector; 
however, data related to the former are limited at present.
6. Amongst the little research in this area includes Raynolds et al. (2007) examination of the role of civil 
society organisations in shaping new organic governance arrangements.
7. It can be expected that these events will be increasingly attended by Southern stakeholders, given that 
75% of IFOAM’s membership base is now located in the global south (Raynolds, 2004).
8. The Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative is demonstrative of Uganda’s long history of cooperative 
forms of organizing, although Uganda’s economic reforms since the 1980s have been associated with 
the dismantling of many (see Wiegratz, 2010).
9. There are only few countries in the global south that have achieved recognition for domestic inspec-
tors to undertake organic inspection, and amongst these include Brazil, China, Egypt, Nicaragua and 
Peru (Barrett et al., 2002).
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